Winners and Losers in the Folk Epistemology of Lotteries by Turri, John & Friedman, Ori





friedma  n @ u waterloo.ca  
Abstract: Two assumptions anchor most contemporary discussions 
of knowledge in cases of (large, fair, single-winner) lotteries. First, 
based on the long odds alone, you don’t know that your ticket lost. 
Second, based on watching a news report of the winning numbers, 
you do know that your ticket lost. Moreover, it is often treated as an 
uncontroversial datum that this is how most people view matters. 
Explaining  why people hold this combination of attitudes is then 
treated as a  criterion for  an acceptable theory of knowledge and 
knowledge  attributions.  But  do  people  actually  hold  the  views 
they’re assumed to hold?  We did the necessary empirical work to 
find out. We studied people’s reactions to lottery cases and discov-
ered that they respond as  predicted.  We report those results here. 
We also  evaluate three previous  explanations for why people deny 
knowledge in lottery cases; none of them seems to work. Finally, we 
present evidence for a new explanation for why  some people deny 
knowledge in lottery cases. We suggest that they deny knowledge in 
lottery cases due to formulaic expression.
* This is a draft (2013-09-04)  of a paper to appear in  Advances in Experi­
mental Epistemology, ed. James Beebe (Continuum). Comments welcome. 
Please don’t cite,  quote or refute without permission.  Authorship  is  co-
equal and listed un-alphabetically.
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1. Introduction
Suppose that Smith is considering the fate of a particular ticket in a 
large, fair lottery.1 After considering the long odds, Smith concludes 
that the ticket  is a loser  and, unsurprisingly,  Smith is right. Does 
Smith know that the ticket is a loser, or does he only believe it? As 
Jonathan Vogel  puts  it,  “No matter  how high  the  odds  that  the 
ticket will not win, it strikes us that [Smith] doesn’t know that [the] 
ticket will not win” (Vogel 1990: 292). Call this the skeptical lottery 
judgment.
Now suppose that  Brown is considering the fate of that very 
same lottery ticket. After hearing the winning numbers announced 
on the nightly news, Brown concludes that the ticket is a loser. Does 
Brown know that the ticket is a loser, or does she only believe it? As 
Keith DeRose  notes,  “after she’s  heard the winning numbers an-
nounced,”  people “judge that  [Brown] does know” (DeRose 1996: 
570ff). Call this a nonskeptical lottery judgment.
This  combination of  skeptical  and nonskeptical  tendencies is 
puzzling.  After  all, mistaken  testimony seems  much  more  likely 
than winning the lottery. Indeed, even if you watch the drawing in 
person and see the  winning number with your  own  eyes,  it’s  far 
from clear that  misperception is any less likely than a  false infer­
ence  based on the  long odds. Nevertheless,  people readily  judge 
that you know the ticket lost after being told the results or watching 
1 Contemporary epistemological discussion of lotteries is vast and traces to 
Kyburg  1961.  Influential  recent  discussions  include  Nelkin  2000  and 
Hawthorne 2004.
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the drawing, whereas  they readily judge that you don’t know after 
simply calculating the odds.
This paper asks two  main  questions.  First, do people actually 
display  the  pattern  of  skeptical  and  nonskeptical  judgment  de-
scribed  above?  That  is,  do  people  share  (a)  the  skeptical  lottery 
judgment in lottery cases involving statistical reasoning and (b) the 
nonskeptical  judgment  in  lottery  cases  involving  testimony? We 
find  that, yes, people do display this pattern of judgment. Second, 
why do people  judge  this way? Many explanations have been pro-
posed. We assess three previous proposals and identify a new factor 
that we believe contributes to  skeptical  lottery  judgment.  The new 
factor is formulaic expression.
It is widely assumed that people conform to the pattern of skep-
tical  and nonskeptical  lottery judgment described above.  Indeed, 
theorists claim that  it is “uncontroversial”  — a  “datum” to be ex-
plained — that people conform to the pattern (Hawthorne 2004: 8). 
In short, philosophers assume that they have identified  uncontro-
versial  elements  of  the  folk  epistemology  of  lotteries. But  this 
sweeping  empirical  generalization  has never  been  tested.  This 
should inspire caution. For experience shows that armchair predic-
tions often misidentify which epistemological judgments are wide-
spread  and  uncontroversial. For  example,  until  recently  it  was 
widely  assumed that  virtually  everyone  shares the  intuition  that 
Gettier subjects lack knowledge  (Gettier 1963;  see  Turri 2012a  for 
an overview of the literature).  But  it turns out  to be questionable 
whether people  intuit  that Gettier  subjects  lack knowledge (Star-
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mans  and  Friedman  2012;  Turri  2012b;  Weinberg,  Stich  and 
Nichols 2001).2 And this should be unsurprising in light of the em-
pirical  literature on expertise,  which shows that experts are espe-
cially bad at predicting what novices will do (Hinds 1999). If profes-
sional theorists of knowledge are experts in the areas of knowledge 
and knowledge ascription, then they’ll face predictable obstacles in 
predicting what most people will think or say about knowledge.3 
Also absent  from the literature is  any experimental  evidence 
that prior explanations of lottery judgments identify psychologically 
relevant factors.  And make no mistake about it: philosophers have 
explicitly said that they’re trying to explain “why we typically judge” 
the way we do in lottery cases (DeRose 1996: 569), and that they’re 
proposing accounts of “the relevant psychological forces driving the 
relevant”  judgments  (Hawthorne  2004:  14;  see  also  Vogel  1990: 
section IV). Many of their proposals generate testable predictions. 
We test them. The present paper, therefore, is just as much a matter 
of armchair psychology meeting experimental philosophy  as it is 
of armchair philosophy meeting experimental psychology.
We will  consider  three previous  proposals  offered to  explain 
skeptical lottery judgment.
• The justification  account: unjustified belief inhibits knowledge 
ascription.  That  is,  if  people think  that  you’re  unjustified  in 
2 See Buckwalter 2012 for other examples of experimental work calling into 
question conventional wisdom about what’s supposedly obvious to anyone 
competent with the concept of knowledge
3 See Buckwalter unpublished ms. for a discussion of professional philosoph-
ical intuitions in light of the literature on expertise.
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thinking that P,4 they will deny that you know P. In basic lottery 
cases, people think your belief that the ticket will lose is unjusti-
fied,  so they deny that you know it will lose.  (Nelkin 2000 and 
Sutton 2007: 48–53; compare Williamson 2000)
• The chance account: chance of error inhibits knowledge ascrip-
tion. That is, if  people think that there is a chance that  you’re 
wrong about P, then they will deny that you know P. In basic lot-
tery cases,  people think that there’s a chance that you’re wrong 
about the ticket losing, so  they deny that you know it will lose. 
(Cohen 1988: 196; Lewis 1996: 557)
• The statistical account: unanchored statistical inference inhibits 
knowledge ascription. That is, if  people  recognize that you  be-
lieve P based on statistical grounds unanchored by relevant ob-
servation,  then they will  deny that you know P.  In basic lottery 
cases,  people recognize that you believe that the ticket will lose 
based on unanchored statistical grounds, so they deny that you 
know it will lose. (Harman 1968; compare Nelkin 2000: 396ff)5
We will also propose and test a new account of our own.
• The formulaic account: formulaic expression inhibits knowledge 
ascription in basic lottery cases.
Here is the plan for the paper. Section 2 reports an experiment 
4 We use ‘P’ and ‘Q’ as placeholders for declarative sentences or that-clauses.
5 Cohen  (1988: 106) attributes skeptical  judgment in lottery cases to “the 
statistical nature of our reasons.” But it turns out that, on Cohen’s view, 
this is just a mechanism for making the chance of error salient, and it is the 
chance  of  error  that  really  explains  skeptical  judgment.  Writes  Cohen, 
“When the chance of error is salient, we are reluctant to attribute know-
ledge. Statistical reasons of the sort [possessed] in the lottery case make 
the chance of error salient.”
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that tests whether people share the skeptical judgment in basic lot-
tery cases.  It  also provides an initial  test  of the  justification and 
chance accounts of skeptical judgment. Section 3 reports an experi-
ment that tests whether people share the nonskeptical judgment in 
testimonial lottery cases. It also provides a more pointed test of the 
chance account. Section 4 reports an experiment that tests the sta-
tistical account. Section 5 reports an experiment that provides an 
initial  test  of the formulaic account.  Section 6 reports an experi-
ment that further tests the formulaic account. Section 7 is a general 
discussion of the significance of our findings.
2. Experiment  1:  skeptical  judgment  in  basic  lottery  
cases and the justification account’s demise
We begin by  reporting a simple experiment designed to test  two 
things. First, it tests whether  participants tend to deny knowledge 
in basic lottery cases.  Second, it tests whether either the justifica-
tion account or the chance account can help to  explain  skeptical 
judgment in lottery cases.
Participants (N=45,  69% males) were recruited and tested us-
ing an online  platform (Qualtrics  and Amazon Mechanical  Turk) 
and compensated $.25 for approximately two minutes of their time. 
Participants were 29 years old on average.6 Participants were lo-
cated in the United States and 91% listed English as a native lan-
guage.  Participants were not allowed to retake the survey and  re-
6 An omnibus analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed no effect of sex or age. 
The same is true of all other experiments reported in this paper.
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peat  participation was  prevented  by  screening  Mechanical  Turk 
Worker IDs.  Participants read a simple story and then answered a 
series of comprehension and test questions, followed by a brief de-
mographic questionnaire. Test and comprehension questions were 
always asked in the same order; the order of response options was 
rotated randomly. Participants who failed comprehension questions 
were excluded from the analysis.  We followed these same proce-
dures in all the studies reported in this paper.
Participants read this story:
Lois is checking out at the grocery store. The clerk says to 
her, "Do you want to buy a lottery ticket?" Lois answers, "No 
thanks  — I'm not going to buy a losing lottery ticket." And 
Lois is right: the ticket is a loser.
Participants answered these dichotomous test questions pertaining 
to knowledge, justification, and the chance of error:
Lois _____ that the ticket is a loser. [knows/only believes]
Lois  is  _____  in  believing  that  the  ticket  is  a  loser. 
[justified/unjustified]
Was there at least some chance,  no matter how small, that 
the ticket was a winner? [yes/no]
Upon answering the  dichotomous  knowledge question and the  di-
chotomous  justification  question,  respectively,  participants  were 
asked to rate how confident they were in their answer. Responses 
were collected on a 1–10 scale, anchored with “not at all confident” 
(=1) and “completely confident” (=10).
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Answers to the dichotomous knowledge and justification ques-
tions were scored either  +1 (knows, justified) or -1 (only believes, 
unjustified). In each case, we combined the answer to the dichoto-
mous question with the confidence rating by multiplying them. The 
result is a  weighted knowledge score and a  weighted justification 
score, each of which fell on a 20-point scale ranging from -10 (max-
imum knowledge- or justification denial) to +10 (maximum knowl-
edge- or justification ascription).
The results demonstrate that the skeptical lottery judgment is 
widely shared in basic lottery cases. The vast majority (91%) of par-
ticipants judged that Lois only believes that the ticket is  a loser. 
This is  significantly more than could be expected by chance.7 The 
mean  weighted  knowledge  score  (-7.36)  was significantly  below 
midpoint (=0) on the scale (which, again, ranges from -10 through 
+10).8
In light of that resounding result, let’s examine participant re-
sponse to the justification question.  This will  tell  us whether the 
justification  account  might be  on the right track. The justification 
account says that in basic lottery cases people deny knowledge be-
cause  they think that justification is absent.  So if the justification 
account is correct, very few participants should say that Lois is jus-
tified in thinking that the ticket is a loser. That is, almost all partici-
pants should answer “no” to the justification question and the mean 
weighted justification score should be very low.  The results were 
7 Binomial test, p<.000001.
8 One-sample t-test, t(44)=-8.9, p<.000001.
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highly unfavorable to the justification account. A very strong major-
ity  (80%) answered  “yes”  to  the  justification  question,  which  is 
more than could be expected by chance.9 The mean weighted justifi-
cation  score  (+6.13)  was much  higher  than  the  mean  weighted 
knowledge score  and,  importantly, significantly  higher than mid-
point on the scale.10 These results strongly suggest that when people 
deny knowledge in lottery cases, it’s not because they think justifi-
cation is absent.
Next let’s examine participant response to the chance question. 
This will tell us whether  the chance account might be on the right 
track. The chance account says that in basic lottery cases  people 
deny  knowledge  because  they think  that  there’s  a  chance  you’re 
wrong. So if the chance account is correct, then we should expect al-
most  all  participants  to answer  that there was a chance that the 
ticket was a winner.  That is, almost all participants should answer 
“yes” to the chance question. The results  were highly favorable to 
the  chance  account.  The  vast  majority  (96%)  of  participants  an-
swered “yes” to the chance question, which is what we would expect 
if the chance account explains skeptical lottery judgment.
9 Binomial, p<.0001.
10 One-sample t-test, t(44)=5.97, p<.000001.
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Weighted knowledge score -7.36
Ascribing knowledge (%yes) 9%
Weighted justification score +6.13
Ascribing justification (%yes) 80%
Chance of error (%yes) 96%
Table 1: Experiment  1:  The percentage of participants answering “yes” to the knowl­
edge, justification and chance questions, as well as  the mean weighted knowledge and 
justification  scores (derived by multiplying dichotomous knowledge choice by confi­
dence).
In  summary,  our  findings  from  Experiment  1 suggest three 
things. First, the skeptical lottery judgment is widely shared in basic 
lottery cases. Second, the justification account of the skeptical lot-
tery judgment is  almost certainly false. Third, the chance account 
does a good job of explaining the skeptical judgment in this case 
and so merits further consideration. 
3. Experiment 2:  nonskeptical judgment in testimonial  
lottery cases and the chance account’s demise
In this section we report an experiment designed to do three things. 
First, it seeks to replicate our finding from Experiment 1 on skepti­
cal judgment in basic lottery cases. Second, it tests whether people 
tend to judge lottery cases differently  when the protagonist  con-
cludes that the ticket lost based on testimony  (as opposed to  the 
long  odds).  That  is,  it  tests whether  people  do  tend  toward 
nonskeptical judgment in testimonial lottery cases. Third, it further 
tests the chance account of skeptical lottery judgment.
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Participants (N=143, 51% males) were assigned to one of three 
conditions: Odds, News, and Odd News. Participants were 32 years 
old on average.  Ninety-six percent listed English as a native lan-
guage.  Participants  in  Odds read  a  basic  lottery  case  where the 
ticket owner doesn’t watch a newscast but simply bases her belief 
on the long odds.  Participants in  News read a story about a ticket 
owner  who watches  the  evening newscast of  the  winning  lottery 
numbers;  no odds  or chances are ever mentioned. Participants in 
Odd  News read  a  similar  story,  except  that  this  time  the  ticket 
owner recalls the odds of a newscaster misreporting the winning 
number  and  bases  her  belief  on  that. All  participants  answered 
comprehension  questions  and  two  test  questions, a  knowledge 
question and a chance question, analogous to the questions from 
Experiment  1.  Participants  also  rated  how  confident  they  were 
about their answer to the knowledge question.
Here are the three stories (manipulations underlined):
[NEWS]11 Ellen bought a ticket in this week's Super Lotto. 
Her  numbers  are  49-20-3-15-37-29-8.  Ellen  just  finished 
watching the evening news and they reported that  a com-
pletely  different  number won.  It  was the same newscaster 
that  reports  the  winning  number  every  week  on the  local 
channel that Ellen watches. On that basis,  Ellen concludes 
11 We use caps to name narrative elements, and we often name narrative ele-
ments after the experimental conditions they were used in. This eases ex-
position and helps readers keep track of which stories appeared in which 
conditions, while avoiding confusion between the experimental conditions 
and the stories. (Participants never saw the labels.)
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that her ticket lost. And she is right: her ticket lost. 
[ODD  NEWS]  Ellen  bought  a  ticket  in  this  week's  Super 
Lotto.  Her numbers are 49-20-3-15-37-29-8. Ellen just fin-
ished watching the evening news and they reported that a 
completely different number won.  And she recalls from her 
statistics class that there is only a 1-in-10,000,000 (one-in-
ten-million) chance that a newscaster will misreport the win-
ning number. On that basis, Ellen concludes that her ticket 
lost. And she is right: her ticket lost.
[ODDS] Ellen bought a ticket in this week's Super Lotto. Her 
numbers are 49-20-3-15-37-29-8. Ellen wasn't able to watch 
the evening news where they reported which number won. 
But she recalls from her statistics class that there is only a 1-
in-10,000,000  (one-in-ten-million)  chance  that  a  Super 
Lotto ticket will win. On that basis, Ellen concludes that her 
ticket lost. And she is right: her ticket lost.
Turning now to analyzing the results, there was an overall effect 
of condition on knowledge ascription (see Table 2).12 Next we’ll look 
for three things.  First,  we’ll  check whether the pattern of  knowl-
edge-ascription in  Odds replicates the pattern observed in Experi-
ment 1. Second, we’ll check whether knowledge ascription in News 
displays  the  predicted  nonskeptical  pattern.  Third,  we’ll  check 
whether the chance account correctly predicts the overall relation-
12 For  the  dichotomous  knowledge  question:  X2(df=2,N=143)=33.74, 
p<.000001. For the weighted knowledge ascription: ANOVA,  F(2)=22.87, 
p<.000001.
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ship  between  knowledge  ascription  and  response  to  the  chance 
question, paying special attention to the results in Odd News.
 First, did the pattern of knowledge ascription in Odds replicate 
the  pattern  observed  in  Experiment  1?  Yes,  it  did.  As  before,  a 
strong majority (80%) denied that Ellen knows that the ticket lost, 
which  falls significantly  above chance.13 And  the  mean  weighted 
knowledge ascription (-5.7) fell significantly below midpoint.14 
Second, did knowledge ascription in News display the predicted 
nonskeptical pattern? It did so beautifully. In News we see the mir-
ror image of Odds. A strong majority in News (80%) answered that 
Ellen  knows  that  the  ticket  lost,  which  is  significantly  above 
chance.15 Mean  weighted  knowledge  ascription  was  also  signifi-
cantly above the midpoint (+5.78).16
Third, did the chance account correctly predict the overall rela-
tionship between knowledge ascription and response to the chance 
question?  The chance account says that  people deny knowledge in 
basic lottery cases because  they think that there’s a chance you’re 
wrong about the ticket losing. The chance account fits well with the 
results from  the  Odds condition:  few people ascribed knowledge, 
and most people affirmed the chance of error. The chance account 
fits  less  well  with  the  results  from  News:  most  people  ascribed 
13 Binomial, p<.001.
14 One-sample t-test, t(39)=5.03, p<.0001. We should also acknowledge that 
dichotomous  responses  were  lower  than  in  Experiment  1  (binomial, 
p=.048),  though mean weighted scores did not differ from scores in that 
experiment (one-sample t-test, t(39)=1.465, p=.151).
15 Binomial, p<.001.
16 One-sample t-test, t(40)=4.812, p<.0001.
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knowledge, while a middling percentage affirmed the chance of er-
ror. Most importantly, the chance account fits very poorly with the 
results from Odd News. In Odd News, a majority answered “yes” to 
the chance question and a majority also ascribed knowledge, both at 
rates significantly  higher  than  expected  by chance.17 The  mean 
weighted knowledge ascription is also significantly above the mid-
point.18 This  is hard to reconcile with the chance account’s claim 
that  people  deny  knowledge  because they  think  that  there’s  a 
chance that the protagonist is wrong.
Odds Odd News News
Weighted knowledge score –5.7 +2.73 +5.78
Ascribing knowledge (%yes) 20% 66% 80%
Chance of error (%yes) 88% 90% 39%
Table 2: Experiment 2: Comparison across conditions of the percentage of participants 
answering “yes” to the knowledge and chance questions,  the mean weighted knowl­
edge scores (derived by multiplying dichotomous knowledge choice by confidence), and 
percentage of participants affirming chance of error.
Further difficulties for the chance account arise when compar-
ing responses across conditions. Chance judgments in Odd News 
and Odds don’t differ significantly,19 whereas knowledge ascription 
in the two conditions  does differ significantly.20 Moreover, knowl-
edge ascription in Odd News and  Odds doesn’t differ significantly 
(although  by  one  measure  the  difference is  trending),21 whereas 
17 Binomial, both ps≤.015.
18 One-sample t-test, t(61)=2.49, p=.016.
19 Fisher’s exact test, p=.748.
20 For  the  dichotomous  knowledge  question:  Fisher’s,  p<.00001.  For  the 
weighted knowledge ascription: ANOVA: F(1)=26.4, p=.000001, hp2=.21.
21 For  the  dichotomous  knowledge  question:  Fisher’s,  p=.124.  For  the 
weighted knowledge ascription: ANOVA:  F(1)=3.37,  p=.07, hp2=.032.  We 
15  |  Folk epistemology of lotteries
chance judgments in the two conditions do differ significantly.22 If 
the chance account  were on the right track, we shouldn’t observe 
these outcomes.
To put these  difficulties another way, the chance account pre-
dicts that  the rate at which participants ascribe knowledge should 
be inversely proportional to the rate at which they affirm a chance 
of  error.  Odds and News roughly  fit  this  pattern,  but  Odd News 
doesn’t.
We anticipate  the  following  objection to  our  criticism of  the 
chance account. Arguably a fairer test of the chance account would 
begin by eliminating from the analysis all participants who denied 
that there was a chance that Ellen’s ticket won. For, it could be ar-
gued, those participants rejected a basic premise of the story by re-
jecting the error possibility.23 With those participants eliminated, 
the chance account predicts that the remaining participants (who 
all affirmed a chance of error) should overwhelmingly deny knowl-
edge. 
However, following  through on this suggestion  wreaks greater 
havoc on the chance account (Table 3). For after we eliminate par-
ticipants  who answered  “no”  to  the  chance  question, the  rate  of 
knowledge ascription in Odd News and News is identical.  More-
note that the p-value on the ANOVA is trending and probably would turn 
significant  with  a  larger  sample size.  Proponents  of  the  chance  account 
might take some comfort in this.
22 Fisher’s, p<.000001.
23 There are other ways to interpret such a denial. For example, these parti-
cipants might be interpreting “chance” as “genuine chance” or “meaningful 
chance” or “chance that should be taken into account” for planning pur-
poses. We won’t pursue the matter here.
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over,  if we combine  the remaining participants in Odd News and 
News for purposes of analysis, the aggregate rate of knowledge as-
cription (63%)  is  significantly  above  chance,24 and  the  aggregate 
mean weighted knowledge score (+2.26) is significantly above mid-
point.25 But now that we’re analyzing only participants who affirm 
the possibility of error, the chance account can’t explain this enor-
mous disparity with these results and those observed in Odds. 
Odds Odd News News
Weighted knowledge score –6.86 +2.09 +2.44
Ascribing knowledge (%yes) 14% 63% 63%
N= 35 56 16
Table 3: Experiment 2:  Including only participants who answered “yes” to the chance 
question. Comparison across conditions of mean weighted knowledge scores  and  the 
percentage of participants answering “yes” to the dichotomous knowledge question.
In summary, our findings  from Experiment  2 taught us three 
things. First,  we replicated the skeptical result from Experiment 1, 
again observing that a very strong majority share the skeptical judg-
ment in basic lottery cases. Second, a very strong majority share the 
nonskeptical judgment in basic testimonial lottery cases.  This pair 
of results confirms that philosophers have mainly gotten  the rolk 
epistemology of lotteries correct. Third, the chance account of skep-
tical lottery judgments faces some problems. Of course, it’s consis-
tent with our findings that the chance account captures a small part 
of what explains skeptical lottery judgment. We don’t claim to have 
ruled that out. Neither do we rule out more sophisticated versions 
24 Binomial, p.=.044.
25 One-sample t-test, t(71)=2.06, p=.043.
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of the chance account or more sophisticated ways of testing its via-
bility. Nevertheless, our findings in this experiment motivate us to 
seek alternatives.
4. Experiment 3: skeptical judgment in other statistical 
cases and the statistical account’s demise
In this section we evaluate the statistical account of skeptical lottery 
judgment in light of the results from Experiment 2. We then report 
an experiment designed to further test the statistical account.
It might initially seem that Experiment 2 also provides evidence 
against the statistical account of skeptical judgment in basic lottery 
cases. For Ellen’s statistical inference in Odd News very closely re-
sembles her statistical inference in Odds. In each case she recalled 
that there was a 1-in-10,000,000 chance of error and on that basis 
concluded that the ticket lost.  Despite Ellen’s use of statistical rea-
soning in each case, people judge them very differently. They judge 
nonskeptically in Odd News but skeptically in Odds. The statistical 
account can’t explain why.
Tempting as that line of criticism might be, it misconstrues the 
statistical account. The statistical account doesn’t identify the rele-
vant factor as statistical inference per se. Rather, it identifies unan­
chored statistical inference as the culprit. Let us explain.
Unanchored statistical inference  occurs when the relationship 
between the  premises and the conclusion is merely statistical and 
not explanatory. Inference in testimonial lottery cases arguably in-
volves explanation.  Gilbert  Harman notes that  our “natural  non-
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philosophical” view of true testimonial belief involves two assump-
tions (Harman 1968: 166–7). First, you believe the truth because an 
informant told you. Second, your informant believes what he says 
and “believes as he does because he” has first-hand knowledge (or 
was told by someone else who does have first-hand knowledge). In 
Odd News these explanatory assumptions inform Ellen’s statistical 
inference, or so it is natural to think. The fact that she also relies on 
statistics doesn’t obscure the explanatory anchoring. By contrast, in 
the statistical reasoning featured in basic lottery cases, “no explana-
tion is involved” (Harman 1968: 167). In Odds, Ellen’s ticket doesn’t 
lose because it has only a 1-in-10,000,000 chance of winning. Nor 
does the ticket have a 1-in-10,000,000 chance of winning because it 
loses. Nor is it natural to think that Ellen believes such explanatory 
connections are in place.
Let’s understand “observation” broadly to include both percep-
tion and consumption of testimony, and let’s put the essential point 
this way: Ellen’s conclusion is  partly based on a relevant explana-
tory observation in Odd News but not in Odds. The relevant obser-
vation is the newscast,  which leads us to suppose that there is a 
“causal or explanatory” connection between Ellen’s belief and “the 
fact that makes it true” (Nelkin 2000: 398). Thus the statistical ac-
count can explain the results from Experiment 2.
The statistical account’s explanation of the results from Experi-
ment  2  is  ingenious. Moreover,  although  its  proponents  haven’t 
touted this fact, it coheres with a well documented general tendency 
in human judgment whereby “causes trump statistics” (Kahneman 
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2011: ch. 16). Decades of experimental research show that causal in-
formation drives human judgment in ways that purely statistical in-
formation doesn’t. People typically underappreciate and often com-
pletely neglect statistical base rates when evaluating specific cases. 
By contrast, people are better at appreciating causal base rates and 
treat them as information relevant to evaluating specific cases.  Even 
meagre causal cues tend to exert more influence than ample statisti-
cal evidence does (Ajzen 1977: 307). In Daniel Kahneman’s memo-
rable phrase, “A mind that is hungry for causal stories finds nothing 
to chew on” in statistics  about  categories.  Addicted to causation, 
averse to statistics — that’s the fate of intuitive human judgment.
The statistical account generates testable predictions. One pre-
diction is that in lottery cases where the subject  clearly  bases her 
conclusion on a relevant  explanatory observation, participants will 
tend to ascribe knowledge to her.26 In a word and vividly:  if you 
feed the causal monster, it will come. And it will chase our inner 
statistical dullard away. We tested this prediction with the following 
experiment.
Participants (N=133, 66% males) were 29 years old on average. 
Ninety-six percent listed English as a native language. Participants 
were  randomly  assigned  to  one  of  three  conditions:  State  Odds, 
Mafia, and State News. Participants in State Odds read another ba-
sic lottery case, this time about the State lottery, in which Ellen per-
forms  an  unanchored  statistical  inference based  on the  1-in-
10,000,000 chance of winning.  Participants in State News read  a 
26 Assuming, of course, that the belief is also true and, perhaps, justified.
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testimonial lottery case in which Ellen bases her belief on the news-
cast. Mafia is the crucial condition because Ellen bases the conclu-
sion on the observation that the local mafia rigged the lottery such 
that her ticket has only a 1-in-10,000,000 chance of winning. Al-
though  her conclusion is  based on statistical  inference (the  long 
odds), it’s also anchored in the causal-explanatory evidence that the 
lottery is rigged by the mafia. In short, Mafia involves anchored sta-
tistical reasoning, just like Odd News from Experiment 2 did.
 Here are the stories:
[STATE ODDS] Ellen bought a ticket in this week's State Lot-
tery. She wasn't able to watch the evening news where they 
reported which number won.  But she is a professional stat-
istician  and  correctly  calculates  that  there  is  only  a  1-in-
10,000,000 (one-in-ten-million) chance that her ticket will 
win. On that basis, Ellen concludes that her ticket lost. And 
she is right: her ticket lost.
[MAFIA]  Ellen bought a ticket in this week's State Lottery. 
She wasn't able to watch the evening news where they repor-
ted which number won. But she does watch a special report 
that reveals that the State Lottery is rigged by members of 
the local mafia, so that there is only a 1-in-10,000,000 (one-
in-ten-million) chance that anyone not in the mafia will win. 
On that basis, Ellen concludes that her ticket lost. And she is 
right: her ticket lost.
[STATE NEWS]  Ellen bought  a  ticket  in  this  week's  State 
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Lottery.  She just finished watching the evening news where 
they  reported which  number  won.  It  was  the  same news-
caster  that  reports  about  the  lottery  every  week,  and  the 
number announced as the winner was a completely different 
number than Ellen's. On that basis, Ellen concludes that her 
ticket lost. And she is right: her ticket lost.
Participants  were then asked a series of  comprehension and test 
questions similar to those in our previous studies. For present pur-
poses,  only  the  knowledge  question  is  relevant.  (We  will  briefly 
mention one point about the justification question later in the sec-
tion.)
This experiment provides a good test of the statistical  account 
because  we  can  compare  whether  participant  response  in  Mafia 
(anchored statistical inference) more closely resembles that of State 
Odds (unanchored statistical inference) or  that  of State News (an-
chored observation). Participants in Mafia were fed a juicy chunk of 
causal  flesh  — a rigged lottery! — whereas participants in State 
Odds weren’t. So  if participants ascribe knowledge more in Mafia 
than in State Odds, then it will support the statistical account. By 
contrast, if there is no difference between Mafia and State Odds, or 
if  participants decline to ascribe knowledge in Mafia, then it will 
undermine the statistical account. At the same time, we should ex-
pect State News to elicit the highest rate of knowledge ascription of 
all three conditions.
The results undermined the statistical account.  There was an 
Turri and Friedman  |  22
overall effect of condition on knowledge ascription (see Table  4).27 
As expected, knowledge ascription was highest in State News (89%, 
+7.53), far exceeding what could be expected by chance.28 However, 
knowledge ascription in Mafia (14%, -6.5) didn’t differ significantly 
from  State  Odds  (27%,  -4.11).29 Indeed,  knowledge  ascription  in 
Mafia was actually lower than in State Odds, and it was well below 
what could be expected by chance.30 Given that Ellen anchors her 
statistical  inference  on  an  explanatorily  relevant  observation  in 
Mafia,  the  statistical  account of  skeptical  judgment can’t  explain 
this result.
State Odds Mafia State News
Weighted knowledge score -4.11 -6.5 +7.53
Ascribing knowledge (%yes) 27% 14% 89%
Ascribing justification (%yes) 98% 77% 98%
Table 4: Experiment 3: Comparison across conditions of the percentage of participants 
answering “yes” to the knowledge and chance questions, mean weighted knowledge 
scores (derived by multiplying dichotomous knowledge choice by confidence),  and of 
percentage of participants ascribing justification.
It’s worth briefly noting that response to the justification ques-
tion in State Odds replicates  the main finding from Experiment 1 
that doomed the justification account. While knowledge ascription 
27 For  the  dichotomous  knowledge  question:  X2(df=2,N=133)=58.37, 
p<.000001, Cramer’s V=.662. For the weighted knowledge score: ANOVA: 
F(2)=52.96, p<.000001, hp2=.449.
28 For  the  dichotomous  question:  binomial,  p<.000001.  For  the  weighted 
knowledge score: t(44)=8.97, p<.000001.
29 For the dichotomous question: Fisher’s,  p=.186. For the weighted know-
ledge score: ANOVA: F(1)=2.25, p=.137.
30 For  the  dichotomous  question:  binomial,  p<.00001.  For  the  weighted 
knowledge score: one-sample t-test, t(43)=6.86, p<.000001.
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in State Odds was very low, a full 98% of participants thought that 
Ellen’s belief was nevertheless justified.  Indeed, rates of justifica-
tion ascription in State  News and State Odds  are identical,  even 
though rates of knowledge ascription in the two conditions  differ 
dramatically. In Mafia too, rates of justification ascription were very 
high even though knowledge ascription was very low.
In summary, our findings from Experiment 3 cast serious doubt 
on  the  statistical  account.  Proponents  of  the  statistical  account 
might propose a version of the explanatory requirement that avoids 
these problems and withstands empirical scrutiny;  we would wel-
come such a development.  And further work might reveal greater 
nuance in how people  attribute causal relevance to factors and as-
similate that information when assessing  specific  outcomes.  Such 
work could inspire more successful  versions  of the statistical  ac-
count; again, we would welcome this. Until then, the statistical ac-
count is more a promissory note than a predictive theory, and we’re 
inclined to look elsewhere for an explanation of  skeptical  lottery 
judgment.
5. Experiment 4: relenting skeptical judgment in non­
stereotypical cases and the formulaic account’s pro­
mise 
In this section we propose an alternative explanation for skeptical 
lottery judgments.  We don’t  propose that it  entirely explains the 
rate of knowledge denial in basic lottery cases. But we submit that 
it’s probably part of the explanation.
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We suspected that there is something formulaic and stereotypi-
cal about  denying knowledge in basic lottery cases.  Formulaic ex-
pressions are characterized by stereotyped intonation and rhythm, 
familiarity, predictability,  and  unreflective  automaticity (Van 
Lancker-Sidtis and Rallon 2004). Advertising campaigns by gaming 
boards feature  formulaic  slogans  like  ‘Hey,  you  never  know’ 
(Hawthorne 2004:  8).  And in our experience people’s  verbal  re-
sponse to basic lottery cases often comes across as clichéd. This mo-
tivated us to hypothesize  that  although people deny knowledge in 
lottery cases, they should be more likely to ascribe knowledge in 
similar scenarios where the protagonist’s conclusion does not relate 
to lotteries.
To test this prediction we conducted a simple experiment. Par-
ticipants (N=242, 56% males) were 33 years old on average. Ninety-
seven percent listed English as a native language. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions: Lotto and Phone. The 
story for each condition featured two people, Abigail and Stan, dis-
cussing the serial number on a ten-dollar bill. Stan specifies that the  
serial  number is  extremely likely  to  not be identical  to  a  certain 
other number.  In response,  Abigail  flat-out denies that the serial 
number is identical to the other number.  Crucially, the two stories 
differ in what the other number is. In the story for Lotto, the other 
number is the winning lottery number; in the story for Phone, it is 
Barack Obama’s mobile phone number. Participants answered com-
prehension  and  test  questions  analogous  to  those  in  our  earlier 
studies. Here is the story (variations underlined and separated by a 
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slash):
[LOTTO/PHONE] Abigail is talking with her neighbor, Stan, 
who is a statistician. Stan hands Abigail a bill and says, "Here  
is the ten dollars I owe you." Abigail looks at the bill and sees 
that its serial number is 5-0-6-7-4-1-6-9-8-2. Stan continues, 
"I made an interesting calculation. If you  played that serial 
number in this week's lottery/dialed that serial number on a 
telephone,  it's  99.999999%  certain  to  lose/not  be  Barack 
Obama’s mobile phone number." Abigail answers, "That se-
rial number  will not win this week's lottery/is not Obama’s 
phone number." And Abigail was exactly right: it was a losing 
number/wasn’t Obama’s number.
The principal difference between LOTTO and PHONE  is  the 
content of Abigail’s conclusion. In the one case, she concludes that 
the  serial number isn’t the winning lottery number; in the other, 
she  concludes  that  it isn’t  Barack  Obama’s  phone  number. The 
chance of her being right is exactly the same in both cases. If the 
formulaic account is correct, then participants  will ascribe knowl-
edge significantly more in  Phone than in Lotto, because Phone is 
not a lottery case and  so shouldn’t trigger the formulaic response. 
This was our prediction for the experiment.
The prediction was true. There was an overall effect of condi-
tion on knowledge ascription in the predicted direction for both the 
dichotomous question31 and the weighted knowledge score  (Table 
31 Fisher’s, p=.035, one-tailed.
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5).32 On each measure, it was significantly higher in Phone and also 
surpassed  what  could  be  expected  by  chance.33 Interestingly, al-
though LOTTO featured unanchored statistical reasoning about los-
ing the lottery, the rate of knowledge ascription in Lotto more than 
doubled from previous studies to over 50%. If we take as our base-
line comparison the ~20% rate of knowledge ascription observed in 
earlier  basic  lottery  cases involving statistical  reasoning  (such as 
Odds from Experiment 2),  then this increase is statistically signifi-
cant and very surprising.34 The mean weighted knowledge score in 
Lotto was above midpoint, though not  significantly.  We  observe a 
similar outcome in Experiment 6 and discuss possible explanations 
for it toward the end of section 6.
Odds Lotto Phone Odd News
Weighted knowledge score –5.7 .083 +2.38 +2.73
Ascribing knowledge (%yes) 20% 50% 63% 66%
Chance of error (%yes) 88% 88% 79% 90%
Table 5: Experiments 4:  Comparison across conditions of mean weighted knowledge 
scores, the percentage of participants answering “yes” to the dichotomous knowledge 
question, and the percentage of participants affirming chance of error. Lotto and Phone 
conditions are from Experiment 4; Odds and Odd News conditions are from Experiment 
2 and listed here for comparison.
This experiment provided some initial support for the formulaic 
account. The next section tests it further.
32 ANOVA, F(1)=3.973, p=.047.
33 For the dichotomous question: binomial, p=.006. For the weighted know-
ledge score: one-sample t-test, t(120)=2.937, p=.004.
34 Binomial, p<.00001.
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6. Experiment 5: relenting skeptical judgment in quali­
tatively comparative cases
One  question  about  Experiment  4  is  whether  the  results were 
driven by framing the probability as “99.999999% certain to lose.” 
A further test of the formulaic account would be to present subjects 
with similar cases where the probability is framed  differently. For 
example,  it  could be framed qualitatively  in comparison to some 
non-lottery-related  outcome.  This  section  reports  an  experiment 
that follows up on this.
Participants (N=200, 58% male) were 29 years old on average. 
Ninety-seven  percent listed English as a native language.  Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: Compara-
tive Lotto and Comparative Phone. The story for each condition fea-
tured the same two people, Abigail and Stan, discussing the serial 
number on a ten-dollar bill. Stan specifies that the serial number is 
“just as likely to be Brad Pitt's mobile phone number as it is to win 
this  week's lottery.”  The probability  is  specified qualitatively  and 
comparatively.  In response,  Abigail  flat-out denies that the serial 
number is identical  to  one of those two possibilities. Crucially, the 
two stories differ in  which specific possibility Abigail  denies and 
which she ignores in her response.  In the story for Comparative 
Lotto, Abigail denies that the number is the winning lottery num-
ber; in the story for Comparative Phone, she denies that the number 
is Brad Pitt’s phone number. Participants answered comprehension 
and  test  questions  similar  to  those  in  our  earlier  studies.  For 
present purposes, response to only the knowledge question is rele-
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vant.  Here is the story (variations underlined and separated by a 
slash):
[COMPARATIVE  LOTTO/PHONE]  Abigail  is  talking  with 
her neighbor, Stan, who is a statistician. Stan hands Abigail a 
bill  and  says,  "Here  is  the  ten dollars  I  owe you."  Abigail 
looks at the bill and sees that its serial number is 5-0-6-7-4-
1-6-9-8-2. Stan continues, "I made an interesting calculation. 
That serial number is just as likely to be Brad Pitt's mobile 
phone number as it is to win this week's lottery." Abigail an-
swers,  "That combination will not win this week's lottery/is 
not  Brad  Pitt's  mobile  number."  And  Abigail  was  exactly 
right:  that  combination  was  a  loser/it  was  not  Brad  Pitt's 
number.
If the formulaic account is on the right track, then rate of know-
ledge ascription will be significantly higher in Comparative Phone. 
This was our prediction about the results. By contrast, if Comparat-
ive Phone and Comparative Lotto don’t differ, then it will under-
mine the formulaic account.
The prediction was true. There was an effect of condition on 
knowledge ascription in the predicted direction for both the dicho-
tomous question35 and the weighted knowledge score  (Table  6).36 
On each measure, it was significantly higher in Comparative Phone. 
Moreover, once again we observed a significant difference between 
Comparative Lotto and the ~20% rate of knowledge ascription ob-
35 Fisher’s, p=.041, one-tailed, Cramer’s V=.133.
36 ANOVA, F(1)=4.078, p=.045, hp2=.02.
29  |  Folk epistemology of lotteries
served in earlier basic lottery cases involving statistical reasoning. 
Rate  of  knowledge  ascription in  Comparative  Lotto  was  signific-
antly higher than in Odds, for both the dichotomous question37 and 
the weighted score.38
Odds Comp. Lotto Comp. Phone
Weighted knowledge score –5.7 -2.62 +.35
Ascribing knowledge (% yes) 20% 35% 49%
Chance of error (% yes) 88% 97% 78%
Table 6:  Experiment  5:  Comparison across  conditions  of  mean weighted  knowledge 
scores, the percentage of participants answering “yes” to the dichotomous knowledge 
question, and the percentage of participants affirming chance of error. Comp. Lotto and 
Comp. Phone conditions are from Experiment 5; Odds is from Experiment 2 and listed 
here for comparison.
These results provide further support for the formulaic account. 
They also demonstrate that the formulaic account’s explanatory po-
tential isn’t limited to cases  where the probability is explicitly and 
negatively framed.
Experiments 4 and 5 raise at least one unanswered question: 
why was knowledge ascription in Lotto and Comparative Lotto sig-
nificantly higher than in earlier basic lottery cases involving statist-
ical  inference,  such  as  Odds  (Experiment  2)?  Explicit,  negative, 
quantitative framing of the odds can’t be the entire explanation be-
cause  Comparative  Lotto  omits  such  framing.  One  hypothesis  is 
that Lotto and Comparative Lotto are  presented non­stereotypic­
ally,  whereas  Odds  follows the  stereotypical  lottery  “script.”  But 
this  hypothesis  is  too  coarse  to  fit  all  the  data.  For  example,  it 
37 Binomial, p=.004, test proportion=.2.
38 One-sample t-test, t(98)=3.56, p=.001, test value=-5.7.
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doesn’t fit with the extremely low rate of knowledge ascription ob-
served in Mafia (Experiment 3), which seriously violates the stereo-
typical lottery script. Rigged lotteries are not stereotypical.
Another  hypothesis  attributes  the  higher  rates  in  Lotto  and 
Comparative Lotto to  a much more specific  aspect of the stories, 
namely, the losing number’s non­stereotypical source. In Lotto and 
Comparative Lotto,  the  source  is  a ten-dollar bill’s serial number, 
whereas the source in Odds is an actual lottery ticket. Importantly, 
the source in Mafia is an actual  lottery ticket,  so the low rate of 
knowledge ascription in Mafia doesn’t threaten this hypothesis. Fu-
ture research could test this hypothesis by simply matching Lotto or 
Comparative Lotto with a case that differs in only one respect: make 
the source a lottery ticket. If rates of knowledge ascription drop sig-
nificantly when the source is a ticket, then it will support the hypo-
thesis.  And if  rates don’t drop significantly, then the hypothesis is 
undermined.  But even if this particular hypothesis  doesn’t explain 
the difference in question, explaining the difference remains part of 
fully understanding the psychology of skeptical lottery judgment.
Further  research  could  also  test  other  explanations  for  the 
higher  rates  of  knowledge  ascription  in  Phone  and  Comparative 
Phone  when  compared  to  Lotto and  Comparative  Lotto,  respec-
tively. We have suggested that the difference is due to formulaic re-
sponse or habituation in  the lottery cases.  An alternative explana-
tion for  the difference  is  that  people  consider  successful  guesses 
more plausible in Lotto than in Phone, leading them to be more re-
luctant in Lotto to ascribe knowledge that the number is a loser 
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(compare  Teigen and Keren 2003). Successful  guessing might be 
viewed as plausible in Lotto because people are familiar with actual 
instances  where  winning lotto  numbers  are guessed successfully, 
and because successful guessing might be viewed as the  point or 
purpose of lotteries. But this alternative explanation is undermined 
by the extremely low rates of knowledge ascription in Mafia. It’s not 
similarly plausible that Ellen wins a rigged lottery (when she’s not 
the one who rigged it). Nor are people familiar with actual instances 
where someone wins a rigged lottery that the riggers didn’t intend 
her to win.
In any event,  let us reiterate that we don’t think the formulaic 
account explains the entire difference between skeptical judgment 
in  basic  lottery  cases  and  nonskeptical  judgment  in  testimonial 
cases.  Instead, we propose that formulaic expression accounts for 
part of the difference.39
7. General discussion
We have shown that people share the skeptical judgment in lottery 
cases involving statistical reasoning,  and  that they  also  share  the 
nonskeptical judgment in lottery cases involving testimony. In this 
regard, people’s judgments  are consistent with philosophical theo-
rizing and philosophers have gotten the folk epistemology of lotter-
ies mostly correct. We also tested three existing accounts for these 
judgments, but our findings did not support them. Contrary to the 
39 We propose several additional factors in forthcoming work.
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justification account, people viewed protagonists as having justified 
beliefs in lottery cases involving statistical reasoning. Contrary to 
the chance account, people viewed a protagonist as knowledgeable 
in a lottery case involving testimony (Odd News) even while admit-
ting there was a chance the protagonist could have been wrong. And 
contrary to the statistical account, people denied that a protagonist 
has knowledge even when the protagonist's belief was based on an-
chored statistical inference (Mafia).  
Our findings regarding the chance account are relevant to sev-
eral lines  of research in theoretical  epistemology. The chance ac-
count of skeptical lottery judgment is motivated by a more general 
account of the nature of knowledge. Infallibilists, relevant alterna-
tive theorists, and contextualists all view knowledge as, roughly, a 
cognitive state that rules out chance of error.  Infallibilists say that 
knowledge rules out any chance of error whatsoever, whereas rele-
vant  alternative  theorists  and  contextualists  say  that  knowledge 
rules out any relevant or  contextually salient chance of error. But 
the results from Odd News suggest that this isn’t the ordinary view 
of knowledge: most participants ascribed knowledge even while ad-
mitting the chance of error. And many participants in other experi-
ments  did  the  same (e.g.  Lotto,  Phone,  Comparative  Lotto  and 
Comparative Phone).
Our results regarding the justification account should be taken 
into  consideration when  evaluating  the  increasingly  popular 
“knowledge-first”  approach  in  epistemology.  The  knowledge-first 
approach tries to explain important epistemic concepts, such as evi-
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dence or epistemic probability, in terms of knowledge,  thereby  in-
verting the more traditional approach  that tries to explain knowl-
edge in terms of those other, supposedly more basic epistemic con-
cepts  (Williamson 2000).  Perhaps  the  most  radical  plank in  the 
knowledge-first  platform is the identification of justification with 
knowledge (Sutton 2007). To the extent that this is supposed to re-
flect the way people actually think about knowledge, our results un-
dermine the view. For the vast majority of participants in basic lot-
tery cases  ascribe justification but  deny knowledge.  Of  course,  if 
knowledge-first epistemology is intended as a  prescription, rather 
than as a description of our actual concept or practice, then our re-
sults don’t necessarily undermine it.
Our results reveal a further line of research on variations of the 
traditional “justified true belief”  theory of knowledge. Recent em-
pirical  work  suggests  that  the  ordinary  concept  of  knowledge is, 
roughly, justified true belief based on “authentic evidence”  (Star-
mans  and  Friedman  2012).  Authentic  evidence  is  evidence  gen-
uinely informative about reality. If the ordinary concept of knowl-
edge is  authentically  justified true belief,  then  why don’t  partici-
pants ascribe knowledge in basic lottery cases, given that they ac-
knowledge that the protagonist’s belief is both true and justified? 
The presumptive explanation is that merely probabilistic evidence 
isn’t viewed as genuinely informative about reality. But this is com-
plicated by the results from Odd News. For Odd News also features 
probabilistic evidence even though it elicits high rates of knowledge 
ascription.  It  is  also  complicated  by  the  results  from Mafia.  For 
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Mafia features a lottery rigged against  the protagonist’s  winning, 
which arguably is genuinely informative about whether the protago-
nist will win. In these ways, the “authentically justified true belief” 
theory  of  knowledge  (K=AJTB) faces  challenges  similar  to  those 
faced by the statistical account.  Importantly, all of this points to a 
potential fifth factor in the ordinary concept of knowledge, beyond 
belief, truth, justification and evidential authenticity.
Finally, we also provided initial evidence for a new explanation 
for why some people deny knowledge in basic lottery cases: the for-
mulaic account.  Although further tests are needed to support the 
account, the main findings were that many people ascribed know-
ledge  in non-stereotypically presented lottery cases  and  that  even 
more people ascribed knowledge in Phone and Comparative Phone, 
both lottery-like cases.  We also found that the formulaic account 
makes  accurate  predictions  across  contexts  where  the  relevant 
probabilities are framed differently.  This includes contexts where 
the probabilities are framed (i) quantitatively and explicitly, and (ii) 
qualitatively and comparatively.
Regardless of whether the formulaic account is supported in fu-
ture experiments, this finding is of broader import. The finding sug-
gests that theorists may want to be cautious in proposing any gen­
eral explanation of why knowledge is not possessed in cases where 
the protagonist concludes, on purely statistical grounds, that a cer-
tain outcome obtains. For the findings from Phone and Comparat-
ive Phone show that many people are willing to ascribe knowledge 
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in at least some cases matching this description.40
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